


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COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN: Peking has reiterated general political support for Pakistan, but has for the first time publicly expressed a desire for a negotiated settlement of the Indo-Pakistani crisis.

Speaking at a banquet for the visiting high-level Pakistani delegation led by Z. A. Bhutto, Chinese Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei reaffirmed Chinese endorsement of Pakistani unity, blaming "domestic secessionists" along with "foreign aggressors" and "interventionists" for the troubles in East Pakistan. Chi also condemned India for carrying out subversive activities and military threats against Pakistan and for its continuing efforts to exploit the East Pakistan question. In contrast to Chou En-lai's letter of support sent last April to President Yahya Khan, Chi did not directly accuse the US or the USSR of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. Finally, Chi reiterated Peking's pledge that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, China will resolutely support the Pakistani Government.

Chi's statement that disputes between states should be settled by the two sides through consultations and not by resorting to force clearly indicated Peking's desire for a negotiated settlement of the Indo-Pakistani problem. Chi also implied Chinese support for a political settlement in East Pakistan, saying that the problem is Pakistan's internal affair and that a reasonable settlement should be sought by the Pakistani people themselves. He failed, however, to reiterate Peking's earlier endorsement of Islamabad's handling of the situation in East Pakistan.

Although the Pakistanis welcomed the renewed public pledge of Chinese support against India, they almost certainly got somewhat less in the way of a public commitment from Peking than they had hoped for. Bhutto's remarks at the banquet suggest that Islamabad and Peking could not agree fully on how to deal with the crisis. Bhutto focused exclusively on Indian activities to subvert Pakistan

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and on the Indian military threat, and his failure to mention the domestic causes of the problems in East Pakistan implies that the two governments also do not agree on this point.

Despite the presence of high-ranking military officers in the Pakistani delegation, there was no mention of increased Chinese military aid, and Chinese pledges of support were vague and contingent upon external aggression. Although Peking has maintained its political commitment to the cause of Pakistan's unity, it has preserved some freedom of maneuver which will enable it to urge moderation both in Islamabad and New Delhi.

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SOUTH KOREA: The China vote in the UN has created uneasiness in the South Korean leadership and added urgency to the current review of Seoul's foreign policy.

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Members of the National Assembly and the press have also called for less dependence on the US and the UN, and for an acceleration of Seoul's present efforts to develop a more flexible foreign policy. President Pak has reportedly endorsed this line by ordering government agencies to study broader foreign policy options.

Concern over developments in the UN, compounded by the recent US Senate action on foreign aid, will tend to deepen the South Korean sense of insecurity resulting from shifting political alignments in East Asia. It almost certainly will not, however, result in any immediate major shifts in policy.

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